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I. INTRODUCTION
With the October, 2000 term, Justice O'Connor is serving her twentieth year on
the Supreme Court, having ascended to the high bench in August, 1981, after being
nominated by President Reagan as the first woman to serve on the nation's highest
court. During her years on the Court, she has published many well-reasoned
opinions on constitutional issues.
The difference that she has made on the Court in the realm of constitutional law
is most clearly illustrated in the many cases where she has joined with four other
relatively conservative Justices to restrain the more liberal instrumental
jurisprudence developed during the Warren years and shortly thereafter. In recent
decades, when the Court has divided 5/4, the most frequent combination of Justices
in the majority has been Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy and Thomas. This group tends to weigh more heavily than do their
colleagues the values inherent in federalism, the rights of individuals as
distinguished from the rights of groups, the aspect of separation of powers doctrine
which calls for law to be made by legislatures rather than by courts, and private
property ownership. On the other hand, in cases involving gender discrimination,
abortion rights, and the Establishment Clause, Justice O'Connor has been more
moderate, often leaving Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Scalia and Thomas, and
occasionally Kennedy, in dissent. As detailed in the attached Appendix, Justice
O'Connor supplied a decisive vote in many of the twenty-nine cases in which the
Rehnquist Court (1986-2000) struck down acts of Congress. Many of her more
influential opinions for the Court were foreshadowed by her previous concurrences
or dissents, as over time a majority on the Court came to reflect Justice O'Connor's
views.
Exactly how much of a difference Justice O'Connor has made in constitutional
law cannot be told with utter certainty since the Court deliberates in secret. Tentative
conclusions can be drawn, however, by a close look at the 5/4 opinions she has
written or which she has joined.
II. THE DECISION-MAKING STYLE THAT JUSTICE O'CONNOR
BROUGHT TO THE COURT
Justice O'Connor's pattern of voting seems to have resulted from the decision-
making style that she brought to the Court. She does not appear to decide cases on
the basis of an elaborated substantive legal philosophy. Although certain
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constitutional values, such as federalism, are given especially heavy weight in her
opinions and votes, it appears that her primary loyalty is to the process of bringing
reasoned judgment to bear on each case-giving some weight to precedent, to
constitutional language and structure, to history, and to concerns about workability,
logic and justice. Although this is a sensible and historically supported method of
decision making-having been employed by Chief Justice John Marshall-it is not
the only style of decision making one finds in use by today's Justices.
The Supreme Court today has exemplars of four distinct decision-making
styles.' At one extreme are two formalists, Justices Scalia and Thomas. They
emphasize the literal, plain meaning of words. They prefer clear, bright-line rules
that are capable of formal, logical, and predictable application. When using history
as an aid, they search for views of the framers and ratifiers on specific issues. They
refuse to speculate on what history may suggest about broader concepts.2
Closely related is Chief Justice Rehnquist, who follows the tradition of Justice
Holmes. Holmes emphasized the need for judicial restraint and deference to the
legislature and the executive, including a consistent legislative or executive practice.
Holmesians consider the literal meaning of words but are willing to look beyond the
words to their general purposes because, as Holmes said, "The life of the law has not
been logic; it has been experience." 3
The formalist and Holmesian Justices are most often joined by two moderate
conservatives, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor. Those two Justices follow the
eighteenth and early nineteenth century decision-making tradition of Chief Justice
Marshall, which calls for reasoned elaboration of the law in light of its purposes and
history, fidelity to precedent, and respect for consistent executive or legislative
practice. Words in the Constitution judged to reflect the adoption of natural law
principles are interpreted in light of those principles (such as not punishing people
1. These four variations of judicial decision making trace back to views on the nature of judicial
responsibility and the nature of law. See R. RANDALL KELSO & CHARLES D. KELSO, STUDYING LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION 113-23 (1984); Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Our Nine Tribunes: A Review of Professor
Lusky's Call for Judicial Restraint, 5 SETON HALL CONS. L.J. 1289, 1297-1316 (1995). Additional treatment of the
four general styles ofdecision making in common-law cases, statutory interpretation, and constitutional law appears
in R. Randall Kelso, Separation of Powers Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court and Four Doctrinal Approaches
to Judicial Decision-Making, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 531, 532-63 (1993) (hereinafter Kelso, Judicial Decision-making).
An in-depth treatment of the four styles of interpretation specifically focused upon constitutional law appears in R.
Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four Main Approaches to Constitutional
Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 121 (1994) (hereinafter Kelso, Constitutional
Interpretation).
2. See generally Kelso, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 1, at 184-87. Justice Scalia has explained
this method in detail in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Princeton, 1997).
3. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). On this Holmesian mode of interpretation, see generally
Kelso, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 1, at 195-200.
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for things over which they have no control, or not allowing legislation to be based
on stereotypes). Other words are given their ordinary, plain meaning.4
Opinions by Justices Souter and Breyer to some extent reflect the approach of
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, but their perspectives on substantive matters more
often reflect the instrumentalism that was dominant on the Court in the 1960s and
which has long been present in the opinions of Justice Stevens and, today, in the
Justice most often found with Stevens and Justice Ginsburg. In the instrumental
style, the formulation and application of each rule is tested by its purpose and effect.
Judges are willing to engage in a broad-based historical investigation to help
determine overall context and purpose. The primary role of courts is to advance
sound social policies where leeway exist in the law. Leeway can be created when no
law exactly covers the particular situation, ambiguities exist in a particular law
which clearly does apply, or two or more conflicting rules each arguably apply.5
How these four perspectives intersect on today's Supreme Court can most
clearly be seen in the 5/4 cases. This article first presents ten constitutional cases
decided 5/4 in which Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion for the Court. Then this
article describes seventeen cases in which she supplied the critical fifth vote.
Continuing, this article examines seven cases in which she wrote the majority
opinion for a Court less divided than 5/4. Finally, in cases divided less than 5/4, the
article presents thirteen of her concurring opinions and eight dissenting opinions.
From these fifty-six cases, the article undertakes a brief appraisal of her
contributions as a Justice. Within each classification according to voting patterns,
the cases will be ordered according to subject matter, as follows: judicial review
(standing, jurisdiction and justiciability), structural issues (Commerce Clause,
federalism, and dormant Commerce Clause), due process, equal protection, taking,
Eighth Amendment, and First Amendment (free speech, Establishment Clause, and
free exercise).
It is apparent from our review of the cases that if Justice O'Connor had joined
with the more liberal wing of the Court, a considerable body of current
constitutional law would be different. As matters stand, however, she has continued
the conservative perspective evidenced by the votes and opinions of the Justice she
replaced-Justice Stewart.6 Evaluating her work, our opinion in a nutshell is that she
deserves high accolades for her reasoned judgment on both structural matters and
individual rights, and that she will be remembered as well as for being the first
female Justice to serve on the Court, as a dedicated, productive, and useful Justice.
4. See generally Kelso, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 1, at 160-61. Justice O'Connor applies
the same reasoned "natural law" approach in statutory interpretation cases as in constitutional cases. See J. Clark
Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, Statutory Interpretation: Four Theories in Disarray, 53 S.M.U. L. REV. 81 (2000).
5. See generally Kelso, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 1, at 213-18.
6. For an analysis of the votes of Justice Stewart in 5/4 cases and predictions about Justice O'Connor, see
Charles D. Kelso, Justice O'Connor Replaces Justice Stewart: What Effect on Constitutional Cases?, 13 PAC. L.J.
259 (1982).
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III. 5/4 OPINIONS WHICH JUSTICE O'CONNOR WROTE FOR THE COURT
A. Federalism
Justice O'Connor's importance as a critical fifth vote for a robust theory of
federalism was again demonstrated during the 1999 term in Kimel v. Florida Board
of Regents,7 which involved whether employees of an Alabama state university fell
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Writing for a 5/4
majority, Justice O'Connor stated that, under two precedents on whose doctrinal
reasoning she concurred, the employees could not bring an action against the state.
The first was Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,8 wherein Justice Rehnquist had
held, for a 5/4 Court, that Congress could not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
immunity of a state by using Commerce Clause power to authorize lawsuits against
the state. Sovereign immunity could be abrogated only by a clear expression of
intent in legislation that created a remedy for violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The second case was City ofBoerne v. Flores,9 where Justice Kennedy
had held, for a 5/4 Court, that Congress can consider measures to remedy or prevent
actions made unconstitutional by the Fourteenth Amendment only if there is
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end.
Applying these standards in Kimel, Justice O'Connor found that the ADEA was
not appropriate legislation under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment because
a review of the legislative record revealed that Congress had virtually no reason to
believe that state and local governments were unconstitutionally discriminating
against their employees on the basis of age, a classification of state behavior tested
only by rational basis scrutiny. 10 Thus, to create the possibility of individual lawsuits
against states pursuant to section five, it would behoove Congress to build a
legislative record which shows a pattern of constitutional violations, or at least clear
evidence of such a risk."
7. 528 U.S. 62 (2001).
8. 517 U.S. 44,47(1996). Justice Kennedy explained further inAlden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,712(1999),
another 5/4 opinion that Justice O'Connor joined, that the Eleventh Amendment is merely an acknowledgment of
the sovereign immunity which the states enjoyed before ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today.
9. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
10. 528 U.S. at 88-91.
11. Id. Of course, as Justice Kennedy indicated in Alden, 527 U.S. at 759-60, the federal government, as
opposed to individuals, can sue states for violations of federal law without worrying about an Eleventh Amendment
or other state sovereignty barrier. And, despite her belief in federalism, Justice O'Connor has not been reticent about
finding preemption of state law if Congress has expressed preemption or preemption is implied, as where Congress
has intended to subject employers and employees to only one set of safety regulations so that nonapproved state
regulations were preempted when a federal standard was in effect. Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505
U.S. 88, 98-104 (1992). On the other hand, in a situation where the federal government regulates state governmental
operations, as opposed to regulating individuals, Justice O'Connor has authored an opinion for the Court which
requires the federal statute to contain a clear statement to that effect. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61
(1991). The Gregory opinion contains perhaps Justice O'Connor's best judicial statement on the values that
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B. Due Process
Justice O'Connor was a coauthor of the unique three-Justice opinion in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.12 That opinion, which
controlled the outcome, affirmed the central holding of Roe v. Wade, 3 that a woman
has the right to choose to have an abortion before viability-or even after, if
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. However, the joint opinion
went on to modify then-existing law by holding that the Roe v. Wade strict scrutiny
analysis would only be applied to "undue burdens" on abortion rights, while less
than undue burdens would be analyzed only under rational review. 14 This conclusion
was foreshadowed in Justice O'Connor's dissents in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc. 15 and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists," and concurrence in Hodgson v. Minnesota," where Justice
O'Connor developed and applied the undue burden analysis.18 The Casey opinion
also included an extensive discussion of stare decisis, which concluded with the
three Justices asserting that they would not overrule a case merely because they
thought it wrongly decided in the first place. Additional necessary factors are
necessary; that the precedent has proved unworkable in practice, that there has been
an evolution in doctrine such that the precedent is inconsistent with related
doctrines, that a changed understanding of the facts has undermined the precedent,
or that the precedent is inconsistent with the rule of law.' 9
C. Equal Protection-Affirmative Action
Justice O'Connor has arguably done more than any other Justice to establish the
current standards of review regarding affirmative action based on gender or race.
With respect to gender, her 5/4 opinion in Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan20 still stands as the landmark affirmative action case. Justice O'Connor held
federalism plays in our society. Id. at 457-64.
12. 505 U.S. 833, 843 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, J., Kennedy, J., and Souter, J.).
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. 505 U.S. at 876-77.
15. 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
16. 476 U.S. 747, 828-29 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
17. 497 U.S. 417,458-59 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
18. In Casey, the joint opinion concluded that a spousal notification provision was an undue burden on
abortion rights, while a twenty-four hour waiting period, informed consent provisions, reporting requirements, and
parental consent with a judicial by pass option, were less than undue burdens which triggered only rational review
scrutiny. 505 U.S. at 879-901.
19. On this aspect of Casey, see R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, How the Supreme Court is Dealing
with Precedents in Constitutional Cases, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 973, 995-1030 (1996). The four dissenting Justices
in Casey, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas, specified that their theory of stare decisis
did not require that any portion of Roe v. Wade be kept intact, and they would allow states to regulate abortion
procedures in ways rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See id. at 990-95.
20. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
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in Hogan that for the state to engage in gender discrimination to benefit women, the
state must meet the same intermediate standard for review for gender discrimination
against women.2' Under intermediate review, the state must show that the
classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory
means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. 2
With respect to race, Justice O'Connor's majority opinions in City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co.23 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,24 the latter a 5/4 case,
have committed the Court to strict scrutiny of all race-based affirmative action
programs, whether state or federal. Thus, racial classifications even in affirmative
action programs are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that
further compelling governmental interests. In explaining the underlying values at
stake, Justice O'Connor stated on behalf of four Justices in Croson: "Classifications
based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for
remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to
a politics of racial hostility.'2 6 With regard to underlying legal principles, she
explained for a five-Justice majority in Adarand that "the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution protect persons, not groups. 27 She further
explained that it follows from this principle that all governmental action based on
race, not just governmental action against a particular racial minority group, should
be subjected to strict scrutiny to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of
the laws has not been infringed, and that this standard applies to federal as well as
state action.28
D. Equal Protection-Reapportionment
In 1986, in Davis v. Bandemer,9 the Court held that political gerrymandering
was justiciable. Justice O'Connor dissented from that conclusion, expressing a fear
of too-great Court intrusion into the political process of drawing legislative
districts.3" That fear has led Justice O'Connor to take a balanced approach to the
21. Id. at723.
22. Id. at 724.
23. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
24. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
25. 488 U.S. at 493-94; 515 U.S. at 223-27.
26. 488 U.S. at 493.
27. 515 U.S. at 227.
28. Id. Thus, Justice O'Connor wrote for the five-Justice majority inAdarand that Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), which had applied only intermediate scrutiny to federal race-based affirmative action,
was overruled as inconsistent with the three basic premises of the equal protection clause doctrine: "skepticism"
towards any racial or ethnic classification; "consistency," so that the standard of scrutiny is the same no matter
which racial group is burdened; and "congruence," so that the equal protection analysis for states under the
Fourteenth Amendment and the federal government under the Fifth Amendment is the same. 515 U.S. at 223-24.
29. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
30. Id. at 144-46 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
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question of racial redistricting. Writing for a 5/4 Court in Shaw v. Reno,3' Justice
O'Connor held that a claim of racial redistricting was stated when redistricting
legislation created a district so irregular on its face that it could rationally be viewed
only as the result of race being a predominant factor in drawing the district lines,
instead of the state following traditional redistricting principles. She explained that
race-dominated practices reinforce the belief that people should be judged by the
color of their skin and threaten to carry the country farther from the goal of a
political system in which race no longer matters.32 Her concurrence in Miller v.
Johnson,33 which also held a redistricting plan invalid as having been based
primarily on race, emphasized the importance for the result that the state had
substantially disregarded customary and traditional redistricting practices. She said
that the Court's standard did not throw into doubt the vast majority of the nation's
435 congressional districts even if race had been considered in the redistricting
process, as long as race was not a predominant factor in the redistricting process.34
E. Retroactive Law as a Taking
In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,35 Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of
a 5/4 Court that the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 was
unconstitutional as applied to Eastern Enterprises. She also wrote an opinion joined
by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Justice O'Connor's theory was
that the Act, which imposed a large liability for lifetime health benefits of former
employees and their dependents on a company which ceased coal mining operations
in 1965 and had never agreed to make such contributions, so substantially interfered
with the company's reasonable investment-backed expectations that it was a
taking.36
31. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
32. Id. at 643-44.
33. 515 U.S. 900, 928 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 928-29. Similarly, in her plurality opinion in Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996), Justice O'Connor
stated that strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race. It
applies when the plaintiff proves that other, legitimate districting principles were subordinated to race. If strict
scrutiny does apply, it must be shown that racially based districting was necessary to ameliorate the effects of past
discrimination. Id. at 958-59. Also writing a separate concurrence, she explained that compliance with the Voting
Rights Act might constitute a compelling interest sufficient for strict scrutiny, thus again indicating a willingness
to defer to governmental redistricting decisions and not have the Court intrude too far into second-guessing
redistricting decisions. Id. at 990.
35. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
36. Id. at 522-29. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment on due process grounds because of a settled
tradition against retroactive laws of great severity, but he would restrict a takings analysis to situations where a
specific property right or interest was at stake. Id. at 539.
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E Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Joining with other conservative Justices on the Supreme Court, Justice
O'Connor has been a reliable voice for balancing the rights of prisoners against the
security needs of the government. For example, in Whitley v. Albers,37 Justice
O'Connor wrote for the Court that the infliction of pain in the course of a prison
security measure was an Eighth Amendment violation only if the pain was inflicted
unnecessarily and wantonly, and that shooting a prisoner during the quelling of a
riot, without prior verbal warning, did not violate the prisoner's right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment.
Justice O'Connor's balancing of rights of prisoners versus the rights of the
government is also exemplified in Turner v. Safely.38 In that case, Justice O'Connor
wrote for the Court, upholding prison surveillance of inmate mail, but striking down
as unconstitutional a state regulation barring prisoners from getting married. Had
Justice O'Connor not joined the four other more conservative Justices to form a
five-Justice majority in both of these cases, the Warren Court's greater emphasis on
prisoner's rights, at the expense of the government, would have continued into the
1980s and 1990s.
G. First Amendment
1. Commercial Speech
In 1988, in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,39 the Court struck down a
state's ban on direct-mail solicitations by lawyers that were targeted to recipients
known to need legal services of a particular kind. For the majority, Justice Brennan
held that the Central Hudson Gas test was not satisfied by Kentucky's desire to keep
potential clients from being overwhelmed. 40 Justice O'Connor, dissenting with Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, doubted that the Court was on the right track
in this aspect of commercial speech doctrine, and hoped that the Court would return
to the states the legislative function which, she asserted, the Court had taken from
37. 475 U.S. 312, 319-26 (1986).
38. 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987). Justice O'Connor's is balancing of rights is also evidenced in Hudson v.
McMillan, 503 U.S. 1,4 (1992), where she wrote for the Court, with Justices Scalia and Thomas dissenting, that
use of excessive force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment even though the prisoner does
not suffer serious injury.
39. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
40. Id. at 474-78. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980), Justice Powell had written for the Court that for commercial speech to come within First Amendment
protection, it "at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest."
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them in the context of attorney advertising.4' In 1995; Justice O'Connor was able to
bring about some of that return. Writing for a 5/4 Court in Florida Bar v. Went For
It, Inc.,42 she upheld a Florida Bar rule prohibiting personal injury lawyers from
sending targeted direct-mail subscriptions to victims and their relatives for thirty
days following an accident or disaster, and from receiving referrals from anyone
who made such a contact. Justice O'Connor noted that the rule directly advanced
substantial state interests in protecting privacy and the reputation of the bar. Also,
the rule was narrowly tailored in that it was limited to a brief period.43
2. Establishment Clause
In 1985, Justice O'Connor dissented from a 6/3 opinion written by Justice
Brennan in Aguilar v. Felton" which held that the Establishment Clause barred the
City of New York from sending public school teachers into parochial schools as part
of a congressionally mandated program for providing remedial education to
disadvantaged children. Responding to concerns expressed by Justice Brennan that
guarding against the infiltration of religious thought would require excessive
entanglement, Justice O'Connor observed that this risk was greatly exaggerated
because not a single incident of religious indoctrination had been identified in any
of the thousands of classes offered for two decades.45
In 1997, Justice O'Connor took advantage of a 5/4 opportunity to overrule
Justice Brennan's Aguilar opinion in Agostini v. Felton.4 6 Mindful of cautions in the
three-judge Casey opinion that cases should not be overruled merely because of a
doctrinal disposition to come out differently, 47 Justice O'Connor took pains to show
that Establishment Clause jurisprudence had changed significantly since Aguilar
was decided. First, she said, the presumption that teachers on parochial premises
must inevitably indoctrinate was abandoned in Zobrest,48 where a deaf student was
allowed to bring his state-employed sign-language interpreter to his Roman Catholic
high school. Second, Justice O'Connor explained that the assumption that all direct
aid to education impermissibly finances religious indoctrination was abandoned in
Witters.49 In that case the Court allowed a state to issue a vocational tuition grant to
a blind person who wished to become a pastor. Third, she asserted that Zobrest also
repudiated the assumption that the presence of Title I teachers in parochial school
41. 486 U.S. at487-91.
42. 515 U.S. 618, 625-32 (1995).
43. Id. at 632-34. Justice Kennedy, dissenting, stated that the Court should not allow restrictions on speech
to be justified on the ground that the expression might offend the listener. Id. at 638 (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined
by Stevens, J., Souter, J., and Ginsburg, J.).
44. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
45. Id. at 424.
46. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
47. See supra text accompanying note 25.
48. 521 U.S. at 223 (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.; 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993)).
49. Id. at 225 (citing Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986)).
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classrooms will, without more, create the impression of a "symbolic union" between
church and state. 50 Thus, the Title I program, which places teachers in parochial as
well as public schoolrooms to teach disadvantaged children, does not result in
"excessive" entanglement that advances or inhibits religion.
IV. IMPORTANT 5/4 CASES IN WHICH JUSTICE O'CONNOR
SUPPLIED THE CRITICAL FIFTH VOTE
Justice O'Connor's key votes in important 5/4 constitutional cases have
reflected the same priority of values that may be found in her 5/4 opinions for the
Court, and those values have remained consistent over time. This can be seen when
a sample of the 5/4 cases in which she supplied the key vote is reviewed in
chronological order.
A. Jurisdiction
In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,5' Justice Powell wrote for
a 5/4 Court that because of principles of federalism embodied in the Eleventh
Amendment, federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear cases based on an
allegation that a state official has violated state law. Powell reasoned that such
actions do not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law and represent an
intrusion on state sovereignty. Thus, the "stripping" doctrine of Ex Parte Young 52
does not apply to allow even a prospective remedy. If Justice O'Connor had given
federalism concerns less weight and had voted with the four dissenters, the federal
courts today could award injunctive relief whenever they find that state officials
have violated state law.
B. Justiciability
In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,53 Justice White wrote for a 5/4 Court that a case
was not ripe for a preliminary injunction against police use of chokeholds where the
plaintiff had in the past suffered injury from such a hold but did not show why he
might realistically be threatened in the future by police officers acting within or
without the department's policy on the matter. Justice White stressed that a proper
balance between state and federal authority counsels restraint in the issuance of
injunctions against state officers engaged in the administration of state criminal law,
at least in the absence of irreparable injury both great and immediate. Justice
Marshall, dissenting, wrote that this ruling made it difficult for citizens to challenge
50. Id. at 227.
51. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
52. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
53. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
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the chokehold policy. 54 If Justice O'Connor had joined Justice Marshall's dissent,
as did Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, the protection of civil rights would
have been weighed more heavily and past injury plus some danger of a recurrent
violation would be sufficient to support a preliminary injunction. Less weight would
be given to the limitations on Article III implied by its "case or controversy"
language and to the precedents which call for a plaintiff to have an injury that a
judicial order could remedy.
C. Commerce Clause
United States v. Lopez55 was the first case since 1937 in which the Court held
that Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause. The provision struck
down made it a federal crime for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at
a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the precedents call for a determination that
the regulated activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce. He observed,
however, that the terms of the challenged law had nothing to do with commerce of
any sort and there was no jurisdictional element which ensured that the firearm
possession in question affected interstate commerce. He pointed to the lack of
findings which might have enabled the Court to evaluate the legislative judgment
that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce.56
Justice O'Connor joined Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion which asserted
that federalism was a unique contribution of the framers to political science and
political theory by recognizing that freedom would be enhanced by the creation of
two governments, not one. Kennedy argued that the statute upset the federal balance
as it intruded on education, an area of traditional state concern to which states lay
claim by right of history and experience.57
The dissent of Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg,
rested on a theory that guns near a school can interfere with education and that, in
turn, may ultimately affect national economic well-being. 8 If Justice O'Connor had
joined that dissent, the Congress would today have an essentially unreviewable
power to make judgments on what significantly affects interstate commerce, a power
that could extend to regulating the educational process itself.
54. Id. at 127-31.
55. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
56. Id. at 558-66.
57. Id. at 574-83.
58. Id. at 615-25.
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D. Commerce Clause-Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
In U.S. v. Morrison,59 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 5/4 Court, wasjoined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. He held that the federal
Violence Against Women Act, which creates a private. cause of action against
persons who commit a crime of violence motivated by gender, could not be
sustained as an exercise of Commerce Clause power or section five power of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
With respect to the Commerce Clause, the Chief Justice stated that striking
down the law was merely an application of Lopez, 60 an opinion Justice O'Connor
had joined. He further stated that the critical fact in that case, which supported the
Court's conclusion that possessing a gun in a schoolyard was not substantially
related to interstate commerce, was the noneconomic, criminal nature of the
conduct. Also important, and relevant here, was the fact that the Violence Against
Women Act did not express a jurisdictional element which limited its reach to
interstate commerce, the lack of findings regarding effects on interstate commerce,
and the attenuated link to interstate commerce. Further, Congress' method of
reasoning with respect to its findings would allow it completely to obliterate the
Constitution's distinction between national and local authority-even though the
Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly
local.6'
With respect to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Chief Justice
62relied primarily on precedents, including Kimel, authored by Justice O'Connor,
which had established that the Fourteenth Amendment creates rights only against
state action. The law was not congruent and proportional to any constitutional
violations by the states because it visited no' consequence on any state officials. The
Chief Justice also distinguished cases upholding section five action as cases
involving remedies directed to the state where Congress found an evil existed. This
law, in contrast, applied uniformly throughout the nation.63
59. 529 U.S. 598, 601 (2000).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
61. 529 U.S. at 606-17. Justice Souter's dissent stated that in the minds of the majority there is a new
animating theory that has taken the place of the laissez-faire theory which sustained limits on Congress' Commerce
Clause power prior to 1937. The new theory is federalism. Yet the Court decided in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), that state sovereign interests were intended to be protected
by procedural safeguards rather than by judicially created limitations on federal power. He also noted that the
collective opinion of state officials presented to Congress was that the Violence Act was needed. Thus, the majority
was forcing the states to enjoy the new federalism whether they wanted it or not. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 653. In his
dissent, Justice Breyer also noted that drawing the line between economic and noneconomic interests would likely
prove unworkable in practice. Id. at 1774-77.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
63. 529 U.S. at 617-27. Justice Breyer, dissenting, stated that he thought the law could be sustained under
the Commerce Clause and so it was not necessary to consider section five. However, he expressed doubts about
what the majority had held regarding section five. He suggested that Congress could provide remedies against
private actors in this case because that would intrude only a little on either states or private parties since the violent
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E. Dormant Commerce Clause
In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,'4 Justice O'Connor
joined in an opinion by Justice Stevens, together with Justices Kennedy, Souter, and
Breyer. Justice Stevens found unlawful a state law exemption from property tax on
property owned by charitable institutions where the exemption did not include
organizations operated principally for the benefit of nonresidents. Stevens pointed
out that, under the precedents, a state law which discriminated on its face against
interstate commerce is virtually per se invalid.65 Justice Scalia, dissenting with the
Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Ginsburg, argued for treating the exemption
as a subsidy or for recognizing an additional exception to the dormant Commerce
Clause.66 Justice O'Connor's vote with the majority thus helped to strengthen the
Court's role under dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
E Due Process
1. Due Process-Fundamental Rights
a. Bowers v. Hardwick
In Bowers v. Hardwick,67 Justice White wrote for a 5/4 majority, including
Justice O'Connor, that homosexuals do not have a fundamental right to engage in
acts of sodomy. He emphasized that no such right was announced in the precedents
nor was it implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or deeply rooted in the nation's
history and traditions. He explained that, "The Court is most vulnerable and comes
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little
or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. 68
Reflecting her balanced approach towards the substantive due process right of
privacy, however, Justice O'Connorjoined Justice Kennedy's opinion ten years later
in Romer v. Evans,69 which held that a state cannot impose burdens on homosexuals
merely based upon animus. Thus, a state may not be able to regulate homosexual
conduct in question is, in the main, already forbidden by state law. Id. at 662-66.
64. 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
65. Id. at 581-83. The exemption at issue was a prohibited form of protectionism since it was an attempt to
give local consumers an advantage over consumers in other states. Nor was there any reason why the nonprofit
character of an organization should exclude it from being protected by the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause.
Finally, the exemption could not be considered as simply a subsidy for organizations that focused their activity on
local concerns. Id. at 583-91.
66. Id. at 607-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
68. Id. at 194.
69. 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996).
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sodomy after Romer unless the state can establish a legitimate interest for the
regulation other than mere animus toward homosexuals.7 °
b. Michael H. v. Gerald D.
In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,7' Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the
Court that a biological father who had once established a parental relationship with
his child did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in that relationship
if it was opposed by the child's mother and the husband to whom she was presently
married and to whom she had been married when the child was conceived. Justice
Scalia quoted Justice Powell, who had written, "Our decisions establish that the
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of
the family is deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition. 72
Justice O'Connor, with Justice Kennedy, concurred in the result and in all of
Justice Scalia's opinion except footnote six, which stated that the Court should
always consider the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting or
denying protection to an asserted right could be identified. Justice O'Connor thought
that this statement could not be squared with all of the cases and, expressing caution,
asserted that she would "not foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of
a single mode of historical analysis. '73 This departure is critical when applied to a
case like Casey, where Scalia's "specific level" approach would make it difficult to
find a fundamental right to an abortion, as opposed to Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy's more general approach to historical traditions, which permitted a finding
in Casey that "[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 74
If Justice O'Connor had departed further from Justice Scalia's opinion andjoined dissenters Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and White, she would have
analyzed the case in terms of parenthood, as an interest that historically has received
protection. She would not have required approval from history before protecting in
the name of liberty a biological link combined with a substantial parent-child
70. Establishing such an interest may be difficult for the State, as noted in Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer.
Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) ("In holding that homosexuality cannot
be singled out for disfavorable treatment, the Court contradicts a decision, unchallenged here, pronounced only 10
years ago, see Bowers v. Hardwick .... and places the prestige of this institution behind the proposition that
opposition to homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias.").
71. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
72. Id. at 123-24 (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
73. Id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
74. 505 U.S. at 851. Note, however, that consistent with Justice O'Connor's general decision-making
approach towards the Constitution, see supra text accompanying notes 1, 4, this broader focus on historical
traditions is only one aspect of determining the existence of fundamental rights, and must be balanced against
arguments of text, structure, consistent legislative or executive practice, and precedent. Thus, despite the "heart of
liberty" language, Justice O'Connor agreed in Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 129-30, that there is no fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide.
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relationship. If she had so reasoned, the Court would not have allowed California
to deny plaintiff the chance to prove paternity because of the conclusive
presumption that the husband was the father, thus constitutionalizing this aspect of
state domestic relations law.75
2. Due Process-Abortion
In Stenberg v. Carhart76 a 5/4 Court struck down Nebraska's attempt to ban
partial-birth abortions, saying that it imposed an undue burden on a woman's right
to make an abortion decision. The majority opinion by Justice Breyer stated that
states may not ban partial-birth abortions if their laws are vague enough to prohibit
most midterm abortion methods and do not contain exemptions to preserve a
woman's health. Justice O'Connor, concurring, emphasized that a law banning
partial-birth abortions could be constitutional under the joint opinion in Casey if it
was limited to post-viability abortions and contained an exception regarding the life
or health of the mother.77 Dissenting, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, argued that under the joint opinion in Casey, which Kennedy had joined,
the Nebraska statute was constitutional as sufficiently limited to post-viability
abortions and containing a valid life or health exception.78
3. Due Process-Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for a 5/4 Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health79 that a person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in refusing unwanted medical treatment. However, a state may permissibly seek to
protect its interest in the preservation of human life by adopting a "clear and
convincing" standard with respect to a guardian's showing that a person now
incompetent and kept alive only by machines would have wanted discontinuance of
nutrition and hydration. Justice O'Connor, concurring, declared that requiring a
competent adult to endure machine procedures against her will burdens the patient's
liberty, dignity, and freedom to determine the course of her own treatment. She
pointed out that the Court had not decided whether a state has the constitutional duty
to give effect to the decisions of a surrogate decision maker as a protection for the
75. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 141-43. Concern about not constitutionalizing state domestic relations law was
also the basis of Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 71-74 (2000), which
struck down as violating a parent's fundamental right to raise children the state of Washington's domestic relations
law which permitted "any person" to seek custody of a child under a best interest standard, but which emphasized
the uniqueness of the Washington law and "that the constitutional protections in this area are best 'elaborated with
care.'
76. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
77. Id. at 947-52.
78. Id. at 956-79. Justices Scalia and Thomas also dissented. Id. at 853 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 980
(Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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patient's interest in refusing medical care, and added that in her view such a duty
may well be constitutionally required. She concurred because she regarded
procedures for decision making to be an added safeguard of the patient's interest in
directing medical care.8° If she had agreed with dissenting Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, a judicial determination regarding the best
interest of the individual would have prevailed over the general state policy calling
for preservation of life unless clear and convincing evidence to the contrary was
made available. 81
4. Due Process-Liberty Interests of Prisoners
In Sandin v. Conner,82 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for a 5/4 Court that
whether a particular interest of a prisoner was a protected liberty interest would no
longer be determined by whether the state had protected that interest by language
of an unmistakably mandatory character. Instead, it would henceforth be tested by
whether a practice or policy imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. The Chief Justice held that the
prisoner in this case, although held for thirty days in segregated confinement, did not
suffer an atypical significant deprivation which violated a liberty interest, because
the conditions mirrored those imposed on inmates in administrative segregation and
protective custody, and the State's action would not inevitably affect the duration
of the prisoner's sentence. Had Justice O'Connor dissented, as did Justices
Ginsburg, Stevens, Breyer, and Souter, the confinement would have been found to
violate a liberty interest on the theory that a prisoner's confinement as punishment
for "high misconduct" stigmatized him and diminished his parole prospects. 83
G. Affirmative Action in Employment
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,8 4 a 5/4 Court applied strict scrutiny
to strike down the dismissal of a white teacher rather than a black teacher in order
to remedy general societal discrimination. Justice O'Connor, concurring, agreed that
neither providing role models nor resolving general societal discrimination were
compelling justifications. However, in order to ensure against discouraging
voluntary affirmative action plans, she cautioned against reading Justice Powell's
plurality opinion as a holding that only a finding of past discrimination by a court
80. Id. at 289-92.
81. Id. at 302 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., dissenting).
82. 515 U.S. 472, 484-86 (1995).
83. Id. at 488 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 491 (Breyer, J., joined by Souter, J.,
dissenting).
84. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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or other competent body was a constitutional prerequisite for an affirmative action
plan.85
H. Takings Clause
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,86 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for a 5/4 Court that
when a city conditions a building permit on deeding portions of the property to the
city there is a taking unless there is a "rough proportionality" between the required
dedication and the impact of the proposed development. "No precise mathematical
calculation is required but the city must make some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development."87 The Chief Justice explained that he saw no
reason why the Takings Clause, which is as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the
First Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation in these
comparable circumstances. If Justice O'Connor had joined in dissents supported by
Justices Stevens, Blackmun, Ginsburg, and Souter, there would not be a taking
unless a developer could establish that a condition imposed on consent to develop
is so grossly disproportionate to the proposed development's adverse effects that it
manifests motives other than land use regulation on the part of the city.88
L First Amendment
1. Defamation
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.89 was another Powell
opinion. At issue in the case was whether the rule of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.90
applies so that presumed and punitive damages can be recovered absent a showing
of "actual malice" if defendant's false and defamatory statements do not involve
matters of public concern. The Court held that such damages can be recovered
without showing "actual malice" because speech involving no matter of public
concern has a reduced constitutional value. Justice O'Connor did not join with
dissenters Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens who said that removing the
Gertz restrictions on presumed and punitive damages violated the First Amendment
even if the speech was appropriately characterized as a matter of only private
concern.
85. Id. at 286-87 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
86. 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
87. Id. at 391.
88. Id. at 403 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
90. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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2. Establishment Clause-Government Endorsement
In County of Allegheny v. ACL U9' a 5/4 Court ruled that a creche display on the
staircase of a county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause but that was not
true of a menorah placed outside a city-county building next to a Christmas tree and
a sign saluting liberty. Justice Blackmun asked whether the challenged practice
aided religion by asking whether it had the purpose or effect of "endorsing" religion,
an idea that Justice O'Connor had proposed when concurring in Lynch v. Donnelly.92
This holding drew an objection from Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia, that the majority was reflecting an
"unjustified hostility toward religion" and endangering traditional practices that
accept the role of religion in our society, such as legislative prayers and opening the
Court with "God save the United States and this honorable Court. 93 Replying to this
objection from Justice Kennedy, with whom she usually agrees, Justice O'Connor
reasoned that:
These examples of ceremonial deism do not survive Establishment Clause
scrutiny simply by virtue of their historical longevity alone. Historical
acceptance of a practice does not in itself validate that practice under that
Establishment Clause if the practice violates the values protected by the
Clause, just as historical acceptance of racial or gender based discrimination
does not immunize such practices from scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment.94
3. Establishment Clause-Government Grants to Schools
In Bowen v. Kendrick,95 the Court rejected a facial attack on federal grants to
public and nonpublic organizations, including those with ties to religious
denominations, for counseling services and research on premarital adolescent sexual
relations and pregnancy. The majority, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
applied Lemon v. Kurtzman,96 and found that any effect of advancing religion was
incidental and remote. Justice O'Connor, concurring, emphasized that any use of
public funds to promote religious doctrines was unconstitutional. 97
91. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
92. See id. at 593-96 (citing 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
93. Id. at 655, 672 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
95. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
96. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
97. 487 U.S. at 622-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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4. Establishment Clause-State Coercion of Religious Conformity
In Lee v. Weisman,98 Justice Kennedy wrote for a 5/4 Court that a public high
school which invited members of the clergy to lead prayer at graduation had violated
the Establishment Clause by applying subtle coercion to participate in a religious
exercise. Justice O'Connor joined with Justice Stevens in a concurring opinion by
Justice Souter. Consistent with Justice O'Connor's endorsement approach, Justice
Souter emphasized that state coercion of religious conformity, over and above state
endorsement of religious exercise or belief, was not a necessary element of an
Establishment Clause violation. 99
5. Establishment Clause-Incidental Benefit to Religion
In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,1°° Justice
Kennedy wrote for a 5/4 Court that a state university would violate freedom of
speech if it paid for the publication of many student newspapers but excluded an
otherwise qualified student-edited evangelical Christian magazine. He held that
there was no Establishment Clause violation since any benefit to religion was
incidental to the government's provision of secular services for secular purposes on
a religion-neutral basis. Justice O'Connor, concurring, declared that she was
convinced there was no danger that public funds were being used to endorse the
magazine's religious message because of an explicit disclaimer, the disbursement
of funds directly to third parties, and the vigorous nature of the forum.'01
V. 6/3 OR EVEN LESS DIVIDED CASES WHERE JUSTICE O'CONNOR
WROTE THE MAJORITY OPINION
Where the vote supporting a decision by the Court is less divided than 5/4, it is
not clear whether any particular Justice made a difference in the outcome. However,
where Justice O'Connor has written an opinion for a relatively unified Court, she
has not slacked-off in her efforts to present a well-organized and solidly supported
opinion which provides underlying reasons and which logically applies the law to
the facts. That methodology may well have helped to gain, as well as retain, votes.
We will not review all of those opinions because, by our count, there are more than
seventy of them. However, here are several of the more notable cases.
98. 505 U.S. 577, 596-99 (1992).
99. Id. at 609, 623-27 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor reached a similar conclusion in Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000), joining the majority opinion which found
unconstitutional government endorsement of religion by student-led prayers at a school-sponsored high school
football game.
100. 515 U.S. 819, 830-37, 839-44 (1995).
101. Id. at 846-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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A. Jurisdiction
In Michigan v. Long,10 2 decided early in her Supreme Court career, Justice
O'Connor wrote for the Court that where it is unclear whether a state court decision
is based on an independent nonfederal ground adequate to support the judgment, the
Court would no longer deny jurisdiction or ask for clarification but, instead, would
assume jurisdiction on the hypothesis that the state court believed federal law
required the decision. She announced that in order to promote national uniformity
in what was understood to be federal law, the Court would adopt this policy:
[W]hen, as in this case, a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily
on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the
adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear
from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable
explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it
believed that federal law required it to do so. 103
Under this rule, if a state court wants to shield its opinion from review it needs
to make clear that it is deciding the case on the basis of state law. 104
B. Federalism
As most may recall, Justice Blackmun concurred in National League of Cities
v. Usery,'o5 which held that states have a Tenth Amendment immunity from certain
federal regulations. Nine years later, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority,10 6 Justice Blackmun recanted his concurrence and, joining with the four
National League dissenters, he wrote for the Court in Garcia that National League
was overruled and that the states do not have Tenth Amendment immunity from
federal regulation under the Commerce Clause.
In Garcia, Justice O'Connorjoined a dissenting opinion by Justice Powell, who
asserted that federal overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the states and the federal
government-a balance designed to protect our fundamental liberties.' °7 Justice
O'Connor also wrote a dissent in which she argued that the states have legitimate
interests which the federal government is bound to respect even though its laws are
102. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
103. Id. at 1040-41.
104. Id. Michigan v. Long was reaffirmed in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1995).
105. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (providing Congress may not use Commerce Clause power to displace the states'
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions and, thus, Congress could
not impose federal wage and hour regulations for state employees).
106. 469 U.S. 528, 556-57 (1985).
107. Id. at 568-77.
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supreme, and that the Court should weigh state autonomy as a factor in the balance
when interpreting the means by which Congress can exercise its authority over the
states as states. 0 8 She joined Justice Rehnquist in predicting that the Court would
in time once again assume its constitutional responsibilities with respect to drawing
lines defining the scope of protected state autonomy.
In recent years, after the balance regarding federalism issues shifted on the
Court when Justice Thomas replaced Justice Marshall in 1991, Justice O'Connor
was able to participate in making the above prediction a reality. Thus, writing on
behalf of a 6/3 Court in New York v. United States,'09 she distinguished from Garcia
all cases in which Congress had not subjected a state to the same legislation
applicable to private parties but, instead, had "commandeered" the legislative
process of a state by directly compelling the enactment and enforcement of a federal
regulatory program." 0 Applying that concept, Justice O'Connor wrote that:
The Constitution enables the Federal Government to pre-empt state
regulation contrary to federal interests, and it permits the Federal
Government to hold out incentives to the States as a means of encouraging
them to adopt suggested regulatory schemes. It does not, however, authorize
Congress simply to direct the States to provide for the disposal of the
radioactive waste generated within their borders."'
The Court's decision in New York v. United States was reaffirmed in Printz v.
United States."2 In Printz, Justice Scalia wrote for a 5/4 Court, over dissenting
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, that the Brady Act
unconstitutionally directed state officers, as agents of the state, to administer and
enforce a federal regulatory program (i.e., to undertake a background check of
proposed handgun purchasers).' Justice O'Connor, concurring, concluded that
provisions which directly compel state officials to administer a federal regulatory
108. Id. at 580-89. This statement was foreshadowed by Justice O'Connor's dissent in FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742 (1982), where she declared that Congress should not be able to require states to "consider" the
adoption of certain federal regulatory standards because this interferes with a state's sovereign authority to set its
own agenda for consideration of issues of public policy. She added that requiring consideration was as intrusive as
preemption. Justice O'Connor also dissented from the holding in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) that
the federal income tax could be imposed on interest from bearer bonds issued by a state.
109. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
110. Id. at 188. States which had not regulated the disposal of low level radioactive waste according to federal
regulations were required by Congress to take title to such waste and become liable for all damages waste generators
suffered as the result of a state's failure to take title promptly. Id. at 174-75.
Ill. Id. at 188.
112. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
113. Id. at 933. Justice Scalia distinguished early federal statutes on extradition which imposed executive
duties on state officials as a direct implementation of the Extradition Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, section
two. Id. at 908-09. Also, according to the majority, impositions on state judges, as opposed to state legislative,
executive, or administrative officials, could be constitutional based on early specific historical practice. Id. at 906-
07.
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program utterly fail to adhere to the design and structure of our constitutional
scheme."
4
C. Equal Protection-Illegitimate Children
In Clark v. Jeter," 5 the Court unanimously struck down Pennsylvania's six-year
statute of limitations for support actions on behalf of nonmarital children. Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court established that intermediate scrutiny should be
applied to classifications based on illegitimacy, primarily because children are not
responsible for their status as illegitimate and persons should not be punished for
something which is not the product of their choice. Under intermediate scrutiny,
even if a six-year period might be reasonable, it was not substantially related
Pennsylvania's important interests in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent
claims. 116
D. First Amendment-Freedom of Speech
1. Free Speech
Justice O'Connor's free speech opinions have typically reflected an attempt to
balance, in a fact-sensitive way, the rights of individuals with the needs of
government. For example, with Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissenting,
Justice O'Connor rejected in Frisby v. Schultz'.' a facial challenge to an ordinance
that completely banned picketing before or about any residence. She found that the
ordinance, interpreted narrowly, per the town's argument, was limited to picketing
directed at a single home, was supported by the substantial interest of protecting
residential privacy, was narrowly tailored to picketing directed at a "captive"
household, and left open ample alternative channels of communication." 8 Justice
Brennan, dissenting, thought the law was not narrowly tailored because it might
apply to a lone, silent individual, walking back and forth with a sign-a situation
114. Id. at 935-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring). It should be noted that Justice O'Connor recently joined in a
unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000), which rejected a Tenth
Amendment challenge directed at federal legislation that banned state sale and private resale of driver personal
information obtained by a state motor vehicle department. Distinguishing New York and Printz, the Chief Justice
explained that the federal law did not require states in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens. Rather,
it required states who wished to engage in a certain activity to comply with federal standards regulating that
activity-a "commonplace that presents no constitutional defect." Id. at 150 (citing South Carolina v. Baker, 485
U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988)).
115. 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
116. Id. at 464.
117. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
118. Id. at 482-84.
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which in his opinion did not implicate heightened governmental interest in
residential privacy." 9
Another free speech opinion by Justice O'Connor, written for a 6/3 Court, was
Boos v. Barry.'20 There the Court struck down a content-based restriction on
displaying within five-hundred feet of a foreign embassy any sign tending to bring
that foreign government into public odium or public disrepute. Justice O'Connor
pointed out that the statute was aimed at the direct impact of speech and, thus,
triggered strict scrutiny. The law failed this test since it was not narrowly tailored
to an interest in protecting the dignity of foreign diplomats because that interest
could be served by the less restrictive alternative of barring the intimidation,
coercion, threatening, or harassment of such officials.'
2
'
Under precedents decided prior to Justice O'Connor joining the Court,
government employees are entitled to protection against retaliation for their speech
on matters of public interest, 122 and political affiliation can be required only where
appropriate for the particular job. 123 In 1996, the Court extended those precedents
to independent contractors in Board of Commissioners, Wabaunsee County v.
Umbehr and O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake.12 4 Writing for the
majority in Umbehr, Justice O'Connor specified that the case applied only to
terminations, pointing out that the Court did not need to address the possibility of
suits by bidders or applicants for new government contracts.'
25
2. The Free Exercise Clause
Justice O'Connor wrote for a 5/3 Court in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary
Protective Ass'n, 126 that the free exercise of religion was not violated by a decision
of the U.S. Forest Service to build a road through and permit timber harvesting in
part of a national forest traditionally used by several Indian tribes as a sacred area
for religious rituals. She said that the affected individuals would not be coerced by
the government action into violating their religious beliefs, nor would their religious
119. Id. at 495-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
121. Id. at 321-29. Justice O'Connor also wrote a plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and Scalia, in United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 722-23 (1990). The Court held that a post
office could bar solicitation from a table set up on the sidewalk near its entrance. Justice O'Connor reasoned that
the sidewalk, which ran only from the parking lot to the front door, was not the kind that constituted a traditional
public forum. The regulation was valid because it was viewpoint-neutral and reasonable. Id. at 727-30. Justice
Kennedy supplied a fifth vote but only because in his view the regulation satisfied traditional standards for time,
place, and manner regulations of protected expression in a public forum. Id. at 737-39 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
122. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
123. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
124. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,673 (1996) (Pickering extended to independent contractors); O'Hare, 518 U.S.
712, 714-15 (1996) (Elrod extended to independent contractors).
125. 518 U.S. at 685.
126. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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activity be penalized by denying any person an equal share of the rights enjoyed by
other citizens. The government was merely deciding how to use government
property, and that did not "prohibit" anyone's free exercise of religion, as is required
by constitutional text.
121
VI. 6/3 OR EVEN LESS DIVIDED CASES WHERE JUSTICE O'CONNOR
WROTE A CONCURRING OPINION
Justice O'Connor has more often written concurring than dissenting opinions.
Her concurring opinions often provide a clarifying explanation of what the Court
has held or not held and, thus, what questions remain open for the future. At other
times she has objected to the use of some new theory rather than making use of an
analysis already supported by precedent. And she has insisted on analytical logic
where possible. The following are some examples.
A. Dormant Commerce Clause
In C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown,128 the Court in an opinion by Justice
Kennedy, declared invalid as discrimination against interstate commerce a town's
ordinance that required all nonrecyclable, nonhazardous waste in the town to be
deposited at a transfer station scheduled to be sold to the town for one-dollar after
five years. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion. Seeking analytical
correctness, she noted that the law dealt evenhandedly with all competitors, be they
local or nonlocal. However, it was invalid as an undue burden on interstate
commerce. 1
29
B. Due Process-Physician-Assisted Suicide
In Washington v. Glucksberg,130 Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion
of the court, holding that there is no fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide,
even in the case of terminally ill, mentally competent adults. Justice O'Connor,
concurring, noted that the respondents had raised only a facial challenge to the state
law which prohibited physician-assisted suicide. She added that the Court had no
need to reach the question whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing
great suffering has a constitutionally protected interest in controlling the
circumstances of his or her imminent death. She pointed out that there was no legal
127. Id. at 452-53.
128. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
129. Id. at 403-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
130. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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barrier to dying patients obtaining palliative care even when so doing might hasten
their death.1
31
C. The Right to Travel
In Zobel v. Williams,132 the Court struck down an Alaska law distributing the
income from its natural resources to adult citizens in varying amounts, depending
on their length of residence in the state. Chief Justice Burger wrote that rewarding
contributions of various kinds which citizens have made to their state was not a
legitimate state purpose. Justice O'Connor agreed that the law was invalid but, in
an opinion concurring only in the judgment, noted that "A desire to compensate
citizens for their prior contributions is neither inherently invidious nor irrational.
Under some circumstances, the objective may be wholly reasonable."''
33
D. Equal Protection and Peremptory Challenges
In J.E.B. v. Alabama,134 the state had used its peremptory challenges to strike
male jurors in a suit to establish paternity. A 6/3 Court held that the state's gender-
based peremptory challenges were unconstitutional, reasoning that all gender-based
classifications demand an exceedingly persuasive justification. Justice O'Connor,
concurring, observed that because gender-based challenges are sometimes based on
accurate assumptions, the Court's decision should be limited to a prohibition on the
government's use of such challenges.1
31
E. First Amendment and Child Pornography
1. Child Pornography
Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in New York v. Ferber,'3 6 in order
to stress that the majority opinion of Justice White, which upheld a New York
statute prohibiting the distribution of material depicting children engaged in sexual
conduct, did not require states to exempt from such statutes all material with serious
literary, scientific, or educational value. She observed that psychological, emotional,
and mental harm is suffered by children in the production of such material
regardless of the social value of the depictions.
37
131. Id. at 736-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
133. Id. at 72 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
134. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
135. Id. at 148-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
136. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
137. Id. at 774-75.
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2. Solicitation in Airports
In International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,"38 a 5/4 Court,
with the opinion delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that an airport owned
by a public authority was not a public forum and that a regulation prohibiting
solicitation in its interior did not violate the First Amendment. Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that this nontraditional forum had not intentionally been opened for the
promotion of expression in addition to the facilitation of passenger air travel.
Therefore, it was not a public forum, the test for regulations was whether they were
reasonable and not viewpoint discrimination, and solicitation regulations were
reasonable in view of the dangers of duress, fraud, and pedestrian congestion.
Justice O'Connor, concurring, agreed that an airport, as such, is not a public forum
but she noted that the port authority here was operating a shopping mall as well as
an airport. The question thus was whether the regulations were reasonably related
to maintaining the multipurpose environment that was deliberately created. Even so,
she agreed that the ban on solicitation was reasonable in view of the problems of
congestion and fraud. With respect to handing out pamphlets, however, she joined
a different majority who concluded that the problems were not serious and that there
could be no complete ban, though the authorities were still free to promulgate
regulations as to the time, place, and manner of leafleting.'39
3. Regulation of Speech on Private Property
In City of Ladue v. Gilleo,140 the Court struck down a city ordinance which
barred homeowners from displaying any signs on their property except for
identification, sale, or safety, but which allowed certain organizations to erect
certain signs not allowed at residences. Justice Stevens, for the Court, reasoned that
it should first decide whether the city could prohibit the plaintiff-owner's sign and
then, only if necessary, consider whether it was proper to permit certain other signs.
He answered the first question in the negative, because of the importance and unique
characteristics of residential signs after assuming, arguendo, that the exemptions
were free of impermissible content or viewpoint discrimination. Justice O'Connor,
concurring, would have had the Court adhere to its normal methodology of
determining whether a regulation is content-based or content-neutral and then, apply
the proper level of scrutiny. However, she joined the Stevens opinion because
whether the restriction was content-based or content-neutral, it would be invalid.
But, in an apparent attempt to confine the significance that might be attributed to the
138. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
139. Id. at 685-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
140. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
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Stevens opinion, she emphasized that his discussion did not cast doubt on the
propriety of the Court's normal content discrimination inquiry.' 4'
F First Amendment and Commercial Speech
In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,142 the Court struck down a Rhode Island
ban on price advertising of alcoholic beverages that was intended to reduce
consumption by inhibiting price-cutting. Justice Stevens announced the judgment
of the Court but could secure only four votes for his view that when a state prohibits
the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons
unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, judicial review possibly
should be more strict than what is required by the leading case of Central Hudson
Gas.143 Justice Thomas, concurring, called for an even higher standard, saying that
whenever the government's interest is to keep legal users ignorant in order to
manipulate their choices in the marketplace, the interest is per se illegitimate."
44
Justice O'Connor, concurring with the Chief Justice and Justices Souter and Breyer,
concluded that because the law failed even the less stringent standard set out in
Central Hudson Gas, 145 nothing required the adoption of a new analysis. The upshot
of these divisions on the Court is that some uncertainty continues to exist with
respect to the standard applicable to bans on commercial advertising.
1. Establishment Clause
In Lynch v. Donnelly,146 the Court held that the inclusion of a creche in a city-
owned Christmas display on private grounds did not violate the Establishment
Clause where the display included many other figures and decorations traditionally
associated with Christmas and a banner that read, "Seasons Greetings." Chief Justice
Burger, remarking that our traditions have accommodated all faiths, with hostility
to none, concluded that here the principal effect of the creche was to depict the
historical origins of this national holiday. It did not constitute government advocacy
of a particular religious message. Justice O'Connor, concurring in the Court's
opinion, declared the central question was whether the government had endorsed
Christianity, and that depended on whether the government intended to convey such
a message. She found that, instead, the government intended to celebrate the public
holiday. 14
7
141. Id. at 59-60 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
142. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
143. Id. at 501-04 (plurality opinion) (citing 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
144. Id. at 518-19 (Thomas, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 528, 532 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
146. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
147. Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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In Wallace v. Jaffree,148 the Court struck down an Alabama law authorizing
schools to set aside one minute at the start of each day for meditation or voluntary
prayer, holding that the law was not motivated by any clearly secular purpose and,
thus, violated the Lemon test. Justice O'Connor concurred in the result, but chose
to analyze the case under her "endorsement" approach rather than under the Lemon
test. She argued that by mandating a moment of silence the state does not
necessarily endorse religion. Here, however, the state had attempted to convey the
message that children should use the moment of silence for prayer. 149
Similarly, in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet,50 the Court struck
down, 6/3, a New York law which created a new school district on behalf of a
community of highly religious Jews, the Satmar Hasidim. Justice Souter, writing for
the Court, held that the law violated the principle that a state may not delegate its
civic authority to a group chosen according to a religious criterion. Justice
O'Connor, concurring, noted that accommodations may justify treating those who
share a deeply held belief differently, but that this accommodation was too
particular. In her view, a more generally drafted statute might survive challenge
under the Establishment Clause.' 5
In Capital Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 52 Justice O'Connor,
concurring, departed from the theory expressed in a plurality opinion by Justice
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Thomas, which
upheld a District Court's order that a state could not refuse to display on a public
forum next to the statehouse a cross owned by the Ku Klux Klan where the space
had traditionally been open to a variety of unattended displays during the Christmas
season and otherwise. The plurality held that if a purely private display occurs in a
traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal
terms, the religious expression in such a display cannot violate the Establishment
Clause. Justice O'Connor's concurrence, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer,
asserted that there was no realistic danger that a reasonably well-informed observer
would think that the state was endorsing religion because of the display proposed
in the case.
53
148. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
149. Id. at 67-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
150. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
151. Id. at 716-18 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
152. 515 U.S. 753, 764-70 (1995).
153. Id. at 772-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor also joined in a concurrence by Justice
Souter, who said the state's flat denial to the request was not narrowly tailored since the state could have
conditioned a permit on attaching a disclaimer to the exhibit. Id. at 784 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Stevens,
dissenting, thought it was enough that some reasonable observers might attribute a religious message to the state
from this unattended display. Id. at 801-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting). To complete the disarray, Justice Ginsburg,
dissenting, said that since the display ordered by the lower court did not include a disclaimer, the question of the
effect of a disclaimer should be reserved for another day. Id. at 817-19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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The Court's most recent Establishment Clause case, Mitchell v. Helms,
154
underscores the importance of Justice O'Connor's endorsement approach to current
constitutional analysis. The issue involved in Mitchell was whether government aid
in the form of equipment and educational materials provided to public schools,
private nonreligious schools, and private religious schools violated the
Establishment Clause. A four-Justice plurality, authored by Justice Thomas, and
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, held that no
Establishment Clause problem would exist as long as the aid is offered on a neutral
basis to all schools and the aid is secular in nature, without regard to whether the aid
could be diverted by a religious school to the advancement of its religious
mission. 55 In a three-Justice dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens and
Ginsburg, held that secular school aid presents Establishment Clause problems not
only when it has actually has been diverted, but also when there is the possibility of
such diversion. 156 In contrast to these two extremes, Justice O'Connor, joined by
Justice Breyer, provided the controlling vote in Mitchell. In her view, government
endorses religion in the context of school aid only when "the aid in question actually
is, or has been, used for religious purposes."'
' 57
VII. DISSENTING OPINIONS OF JUSTICE O'CONNOR
Justice O'Connor has been in the majority far more often than she has been in
dissent. Even so, she has introduced some new ideas and perspectives into the
constitutional law arena via a few of her dissenting opinions. Many of these ideas
have not yet been adopted in later cases although, as previously indicated, her views
on federalism, affirmative action, the use of the undue burden standard in abortion
cases, and endorsement as a test under the Establishment Clause, have substantially
prevailed. This article provides some samples from her dissenting opinions which
introduce ideas or perspectives that may be adopted by a future Court-depending,
of course, upon changes in Court personnel or shifts in perspective among the
current Justices.
A. Federalism-Conditional Spending
In South Dakota v. Dole, 58 a 7/2 Court upheld federal withholding of 5% of
federal highway funds from states which permit a person under the age of twenty-
one to purchase liquor. The majority stated that this statutory provision was
designed to fulfill a public purpose related to the federal interest in highway safety,
154. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
155. Id. at 809-23.
156. Id. at 890-94.
157. Id. at 856.
158. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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did not call for the states to engage in unconstitutional activity, and did not coerce
the states. Justice O'Connor, dissenting, said that the condition was not reasonably
related to interstate highway construction because it stops teenagers from drinking
even when they are not about to drive on a highway. She saw the situation as
another manifestation of the problem of federalism, arguing that Congress is not
entitled to insist, as a condition of the use of highway funds, that states must impose
or change regulations in other areas of the state's social and economic life because
of an attenuated or tangential relationship to highway use or safety. 159
B. Equal Protection-Discrimination Against Foreign Corporations
Justice O'Connor championed consistency in the application of the equal
protection methodology when she dissented in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Ward.'6 In that case, Justice Powell, for a 5/4 Court, wrote that a purpose to
promote investment in domestic industry becomes illegitimate when furthered by
tax classifications that discriminate against foreign companies. He applied this
principle to invalidate an Alabama law which taxed out-of-state insurance
companies at a higher rate than domestic insurance companies. Justice O'Connor
dissented, with Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist. Her thesis was that
Congress had approved the kind of discrimination present here by enacting the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which suspends Commerce Clause restraints on state
taxation and regulation of insurance companies. O'Connor objected to collapsing
the two prongs of the rational basis test which ordinarily asks first whether the goal
is legitimate and, if so, then calls for only the deferential inquiry of whether the
means are rationally related thereto. Justice O'Connor warned that the majority had
unleashed an undisciplined form of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause
which threatened not only the freedom of the states but also of the federal
government to formulate economic policy. 61
Justice O'Connor could claim some victory for the above idea when the Court,
in Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 162
allowed Massachusetts and Connecticut to favor out-of-state bank holding
corporations domiciled within the New England region over out-of-state bank
holding corporations from other parts of the country. Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the Court, noted that there could be no Commerce Clause objection because
Congress had specifically consented to this kind of state regulation. Applying
rational basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, he held that state concerns
to preserve a close relationship between those in the community who need credit and
those who provide credit are different than the state's interests in Metropolitan Life,
159. Id. at 218.
160. 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
161. Id. at 884-87.
162. 472 U.S. 159 (1985).
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and met the traditional rational basis for judging equal protection claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Concurring, Justice O'Connor wrote that she saw no
meaningful distinction for Equal Protection purposes between the statutes being
upheld in the case and those at issue in Metropolitan Life. She noted that completely
barring the banks of forty-four states from doing business is no less discriminatory
than taxing insurance companies from forty-nine states at a higher rate.
163
C. State Action Under the Fourteenth Amendment
When a private attorney in a civil case makes a peremptory challenge based on
race, the litigant is regarded as a state actor, wrote Justice Kennedy for the Court in
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.I64 Justice O'Connor, dissenting with Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, said that attorneys represent their clients and
their actions do not become those of the government by virtue of their location. 
165
D. First Amendment-Free Exercise Clause
In Employment Division v. Smith,166 in an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court
held that if a law of general applicability has only the incidental effect of burdening
the exercise of religion, the law does not offend the First Amendment unless the
exercise of religion is conjoined with another constitutional protection, such as
freedom of speech or the substantive due process right of privacy. Justice O'Connor,
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, said that she could notjoin the
opinion because, in her view, it was incompatible with our nation's fundamental
commitment to religious liberty. She said that in her view "the essence of a free
exercise claim is relief from a burden imposed by government on religious practices
or beliefs, whether the burden is imposed directly through laws that prohibit or
compel specific religious practices, or indirectly through laws that, in effect, make
abandonment of one's own religion or conformity to the religious beliefs of others
the price of an equal place in the civil community."' 167 She could agree with the
judgment, however, by finding that the state had a compelling interest in prohibiting
the possession of peyote by its citizens.168
163. Id. at 179.
164. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
165. Id. at 632.
166. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
167. Id. at 891.
168. Id. at 893-97,903-07. Justice O'Connor has continued to dissent from the majority's approach to the free
exercise clause in Smith, and has continued to call for that approach to be overruled. See, e.g., City of Boeme v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544-57 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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VIII. DISSENTING VOTES OF JUSTICE O'CONNOR
Where a Justice merely joins in a dissenting opinion written by another Justice,
there is little basis for saying that the joiner's presence on the Court has made a
difference. However, from the pattern of such dissenting votes, one may be better
able to appreciate the joiner's overall perspectives. Here, then, are a few examples
of decisions in which Justice O'Connor joined the dissenting opinion of another
Justice.
A. Standing to Sue
Justice O'Connor joined Justice Blackmun's dissent in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife.169 The majority in Lujan held that Congress could not authorize federal
lawsuits by persons who challenged procedures employed by the Secretary of the
Interior under the Endangered Species Act. For the majority, Justice Scalia said that
such persons had merely a generalized grievance and had not suffered the kind of
injury necessary to confer Article IIIjurisdiction. 170 Justice Blackmun's dissent, with
Justice O'Connor, said that courts would not violate the separation of powers
doctrine if they enforced a right conferred on each person by Congress to enforce
procedures enacted by Congress."'7 Given the broadening of citizen-suit standing in
cases after Lujan,17 1 Justice O'Connor's position in Lujan seems to have
substantially prevailed.
B. Federalism-Term Limits Imposed by States
In U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton,173 a 5/4 Court held that, for members of
Congress, the states could not add term limit qualifications beyond the age,
citizenship, and residency prescribed in the Constitution. Justice Stevens, for the
majority, said that the states didn't have such power before the Constitution and,
thus, it was not reserved by the Tenth Amendment. 74 Justice O'Connor, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, joined in a dissent by Justice Thomas. 75
He wrote that all powers to which the Constitution does not speak expressly or by
169. 504 U.S. 555, 589 (1992) (Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 564-67.
171. Id. at 601-06.
172. See, e.g., Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 769-77 (2000); Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt. Services (TOC), 528 U.S. 167, 180-88 (2000). That these cases represent a break from
the analysis in Lujan is indicated by the dissent of Justice Scalia, who authored Lujan, in Friends of the Earth. Id.
at 197-214 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
173. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
174. Id. at 803-06.
175. Id. at 845-46 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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necessary implication are reserved to the state and that the people of each state share
in that reserved power. 1
76
C. Dormant Commerce Clause
Dissenting in South Central Timber Development v. Wunnicke, 177 Justice
O'Connor joined Justice Rehnquist to protest the majority's conclusion that Alaska
was not released from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny by the market participant
rule because it had regulated post-sale processing of timber sold by the state rather
than paying to have logs processed and then entering the market to sell processed
logs. Rehnquist said it was unduly formalistic to find that the one path chosen by the
state to promote its concerns was the one barred by the Commerce Clause.
78
Another example of Justice O'Connor's impatience with formalism appeared
in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias.179 There the majority struck down Hawaii's
exemption of certain locally produced alcoholic beverages from its 20% excise tax
on sales of liquor at wholesale. Justice O'Connor signed on with dissenting Justice
Stevens and Rehnquist to say that since Hawaii could bar the import of all
intoxicating liquors, it could engage in a less extreme form of discrimination that
merely provides a special benefit-something like a subsidy-for locally produced
beverages.' 80
D. First Amendment-Flag Desecration Laws
Justice O'Connorjoined the Chief Justice and Justice White, dissenting in Texas
v. Johnson,'8' where a 5/4 majority struck down the Texas flag desecration statute.
Justice Brennan, for the Court, said that the state's interest in preserving the flag's
special symbolic value was not compelling because the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea, itself,
offensive or disagreeable. Further, there is no indication in constitutional text or the
cases that a separate juridical category exists for the American flag. The Chief
Justice, disagreeing, said that the American flag has occupied a unique position that
176. Id. at 846-50 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, for the majority, and Justice Kennedy, concurring,
said that the relevant people here are those of the entire United States. Thus, the people, acting through Congress,
can impose term limits on Congress. Id. at 803; id. at 841-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Thomas replied that
this reasoning would be appropriate with respect to prescribing qualifications for the President, but not for the
people's representatives in Congress. Id. at 858-60.
177. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
178. Id. at 101-03 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
179. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
180. Id. at 286-87. Similar impatience with a formalistic approach caused Justice O'Connor to dissent in
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,468 (1998) (Scalia, J., joined by O'Connor, J., and Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (instead of focusing on the formal title of the Line Item Veto Act, the Court should
examine the actual power given the President under the Act).
181. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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justifies a governmental prohibition against flag burning as a form of protest. He
said it was the use of a particular symbol, and not the idea the defendant sought to
convey, for which defendant was punished.'82
IX. SUMMING UP
It is apparent from the cases that Justice O'Connor is not an ideologue.
However, in the structural area of constitutional law, she has been a strong supporter
of federalism and the separation of powers. In the area of individual rights, she has
recognized the need to protect the right of each individual to be treated equally. She
has not shown eagerness to create new fundamental rights, but she has manifested
an open mind to working out accommodations where strong interests
collide-whether under the First Amendment freedom of speech, the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments' equal protection and due process clauses, or the Eighth
Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause. And, in the disarray that exists
in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, she has contributed the endorsement test.
In sum, we think the nation has been well served by this thoughtful and hard
working Justice.
950
182. Id. at 421-35. Justice O'Connor similarly joined the dissent in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310
(1990), which involved a 5/4 striking down of a flag burning statute passed by Congress.
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The Rehnquist Court, in the years 1986-2000, invalidated twenty-nine acts of
Congress. As the Appendix makes clear, Justice O'Connor voted with the majority
in all but four of these cases.'83 In the thirteen cases decided by a 5/4 vote, she was
in the majority eleven times. Her presence was most strongly felt in cases involving
structural aspects of the Constitution, particularly issues of federalism. For example,
the vote was 5/4 (with dissents by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) in five of
the six cases in which the Court invalidated recent attempts by Congress to abrogate
the sovereign immunity of states by action under the Commerce Clause or section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the one 6/3 case, City of Boerne v. Flores,184
Justice O'Connor dissented with Justices Souter and Breyer because she believed
that the Court had erred when holding in the Smith 85 case that only rational basis
review should be used in cases where a state substantially interfered with the free
exercise of religion.
183. She dissented only in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (flag desecration); United States
v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (bar on honoraria for low-level federal employees,
O'Connor dissenting to limit invalidity as applied); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (standard of
review in free exercise cases); and Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (line item veto act).
184. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
185. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2001/A Justice Who Has Made a Difference in Constitutional Law
With the exception of City of Boerne, there were 5/4 votes in all ten of the cases
in which, on federalism grounds, the Rehnquist Court invalidated an act of
Congress. In nine of those cases, excepting only City of Boerne, Justice O'Connor
voted with the majority.
In two other areas of "structural" issues, i.e., separation of powers and judical
review, the Rehnquist Court has been less divided. Justice O'Connor dissented from
striking down the Line Item Veto Act,1 86 but joined the majority in not allowing
Congress to delegate to its members the executive or legislative responsibility of
running an airport. 187 And she agreed with the majority that Congress lacks power
to tell federal judges how to decide cases that have already been dismissed.'88
In the sixteen cases where the Rehnquist Court has invalidated an act of
Congress because of a constitutional prohibition involving individual rights, the vote
was 5/4 in only four of the cases. Justice O'Connor made a difference by voting with
the majority to strike down: (1) an election law provision requiring political groups
to set up separate funds for independent campaign expenditures, 8 9 (2) a law barring
low-level executive branch employees from accepting honoraria for speeches not
pertaining to their work, 190 and (3) a severely retroactive law which required a
company, long out of the mining business, to be liable for the health care costs of
former coal miners. 9 ' In the fourth case, United States v. Eichman, Justice
O'Connor didn't make a difference because she joined three other dissenters in an
unsuccessful attempt to allow Congress to criminalize the burning of The United
States flag as a symbolic gesture.
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I. DECISIONS ON STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE CONSTITUTION
A. Federalism
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity of States
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), 5/4. Congress may
abrogate state immunity from suit in federal courts only by providing remedies
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment that are congruent and proportional
with past or threatened state violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), 6/3. The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, requiring states prove a compelling interest, supports laws
186. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
187. Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252
(1991).
188. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
189. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FC.C., 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
190. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
191. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
192. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
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burdening religious activity was not a proportional remedy under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Justice O'Connor dissented with Justices Souter and
Breyer).
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), 5/4. State sovereign immunity was
violated by a law allowing states to be liable under the Fair Labor Standards Act in
private suits for damages brought in state courts.
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999), 5/4. A law subjecting states to suits under the Lanham
Act was struck down for violating state sovereign immunity.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527
U.S. 627 (1999), 5/4. The Court struck down a law subjecting states to patent suits.
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), 5/4. The Court struck
down, as violating sovereign immunity, a law holding states liable for age
discrimination because Congress had virtually no reason to believe the states were
engaged in unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of age.
2. Tenth Amendment State Autonomy
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), 6/3. The Tenth Amendment
was violated by a law which required states to legislate participation in a radioactive
waste program or take title to all waste generated in the state.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), 5/4. The Tenth Amendment was
violated by a law requiring state and local police officers to enforce a federal
program by conducting background checks on handgun purchasers.
3. Outer Limits on Congress' Commerce Clause Power
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), 5/4. The Court invalidated a law
criminalizing the possession of a gun in a school zone since this conduct was not
substantially related to interstate commerce.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), 5/4. Congress could not
provide federal remedies for victims of violent crimes motivated by gender because
this was not activity substantially related to interstate commerce.
B. Separation of Powers
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of
Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991), 6/3. An act transferring operating control of
Washington airports to a board of review composed of members of Congress
violated the separation of powers doctrine.
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), 6/3. The Line Item Veto Act
was struck down for violating the presentment clause and bicameralism. (Justice
O'Connor dissented, joined by Justices Scalia and Breyer).
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C. Judicial Review
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995), 6/1/3. A law requiring
federal judges to reinstate certain securities suits dismissed as barred by time under
a 1991 Supreme Court decision was held to violate exclusive judicial power to
decide cases.
II. DECISIONS ON PROHIBITIONS DESIGNED TO
PROTECT INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
A. First Amendment
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986), 5/4. The
Court struck down a provision of federal election law requiring political groups to
set up separate funds for independent corporate campaign expenditures.
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988), 6/3.The Court invalidated a content-based
District of Columbia law barring the display of any sign within five-hundred feet of
a foreign embassy if the sign brought the foreign government into "public
disrepute."
Sable Communications of California v. EC.C., 492 U.S. 115 (1989), 9/0. The
Court struck down parts of the 1934 Communications Act banning "indecent"
messages.
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990), 5/4. The Court struck down a
law criminalizing the burning of a United States flag as a symbol. (Dissenting was
Stevens, joined by O'Connor, Rehnquist, and White).
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995), 9/0. The Court struck down
a law prohibiting brewers from displaying the alcohol content of their beer on a
label.
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995), 5/4.
The Court struck down a law prohibiting lower-level executive branch employees
from accepting honoraria for speeches not pertaining to their work. (Dissenting were
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas. Justice O'Connor, also dissenting, thought
the law was invalid as applied, but not on its face).
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FE.C., 518 U.S. 604
(1996), 7/2. The Court struck down an election law which limited political parties'
independent spending on behalf of a congressional candidate.
Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. E C. C., 518 U.S.
727 (1996), 6/3. The Court struck down a law requiring cable TV operators to block
indecent programming from leased channels (and, 5/4, it struck down a provision
authorizing cable TV operators to block indecency on public access channels).
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), 7/2. The Court struck down the
Communications Decency Act prohibiting the knowing transmission to minors of
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obscene or indecent messages via the Internet. (Partial dissent by Justice O'Connor,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist).
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass 'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173(1999),
8/1. The Court struck down a law that prohibited broadcasters in nongambling states
from airing casino advertisements. (Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred).
B. The Takings Clause
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). The Court struck down a law designed to
restore small parcels of individually owned Indian land to Indian tribes.
Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997). The Court struck down a law designed
to restore small parcels of individually owned Indian land to Indian tribes, without
payment to the individual owners.
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), 5/4. The Court struck down
on "takings" or due process grounds a severely retroactive law holding the petitioner
liable for health care costs of former coal miners even though the petitioner had for
many years had not been in the business.
C. Miscellany
1. Import/Export Clause
United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843 (1996). The Court struck down as
violating the export clause a federal tax on insurance premiums paid to foreign
insurers.
United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998). The Court
struck down a harbor maintenance tax on outgoing goods as violating the export
clause.
2. Seventh Amendment
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, 523 U.S. 340 (1998), 9/0. The Court
held that an opportunity for jury trial is required by the Seventh Amendment to
determine statutory copyright damages.

